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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

Case No. 20030851-CA

LEWIS RICKY DURAN,
Defendant/Appellant,

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a finding of guilty of one count of Aggravated Arson, a
first degree felony in violation of U.C.A. §76-6-103 (2003). The Defendant was
found guilty by a jury on September 5, 2003. This Court has jurisdiction over this
appeal pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)(2003).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
POINT 1
WAS THE DEFENDANT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF
THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1,
SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION BY HIS ATTORNEY'S FAILURE TO MOVE
THE TRIAL COURT FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court must determine as a
matter of fact and law whether the Defendant was denied his right to effective
assistance of counsel. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984), the United States Supreme Court articulated a two part test, which was
adopted in State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), to determine whether
counsel was ineffective. The Court held that;
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Id. at 466
U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693.

POINT II
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN
FAILING TO ENTER A DIRECTED VERDICT OR
AQUITTAL AT THE CLOSE OF THE PROSECUTIONS
CASE FOR THE REASONS THAT THERE WAS
INSUFFICENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court should use a question of law
standard of review. "We reverse the jury's verdict in a criminal case when we
conclude as a matter of law that the evidence was insufficient to warrant
conviction." State v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Furthermore,
this Court should review the evidence "in a light most favorable to the jury
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verdict," State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1985), and reverse the
Defendant's conviction only if "the evidence is so inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
the Defendant committed the crime." Smith, 972 P.2d at 651 (citations and
quotations omitted). Since Defendant's attorney didn't move for a directed verdict
it should be reviewed under a plain error standard of review. "[T]o establish the
existence of plain error and to obtain appellate relief from an alleged error that was
not properly objected to, the appellant must show the following: (i) an error exists,
(ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome for the appellant.. ." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
UNITED STATES CONSITUTION
Fourth Amendment
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.

Sixth Amendment
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed; which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,
3

and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
Fourteenth Amendment
Section 1
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
UTAH CONSTITUTION
Article 1, Section 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.
Article 1, Section 12
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted
by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance
of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of
the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases.

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Section 76-6-103 Aggravated arson,
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated arson if by means of fire or explosives he
intentionally and unlawfully damages:
4

(a) a habitable structure; or
(b) any structure or vehicle when any person not a participant in the offense is
in the structure or vehicle.
(2) Aggravated arson is a felony of the first degree.
Section 78-2a-3(2)(j)
(2)The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was charged by Information with one count of Aggravated
Arson, a first degree felony. (R. 001). A preliminary hearing was held on May 27,
2003. The Defendant was bound-over to stand trial. (R. 016-17). The Defendant
was arraigned and he pled not guilty. (R. 014-15). A jury trial was scheduled for
September 4th and 5th, 2003. The jury trial was held as originally scheduled. The
jury found the Defendant guilty as charged. (R. 074-75). The Defendant was
sentenced to a term of five years to life at the Utah State Prison on October 8,
2003. (R. 090-91). The Sentence, Judgment and Commitment was signed on
October 9, 2003. (R. 090-91). A notice of appeal was filed on October 17, 2003.
(R. 093).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On March 31, 2003, the Defendant lived at 2621 Madison Apt. number 2, in
Ogden, Utah. In the early morning hours of March 31, 2003, there was a fire in the
5

Defendant's apartment. Sometime before the fire started, Robert Nelson, visited
his friend, Scott Cole, who lived in the same apartment complex as the Defendant.
When Mr. Nelson arrived at the apartment complex he observed that the
Defendant's apartment door was open and the Defendant was pacing back and
forth outside the apartment. (R. 136/31). The Defendant appeared to be the only
one awake in the building. (R. 136/34). Mr. Nelson was at Scott Cole's for a short
time and then left. Mr. Nelson didn't see any evidence of a fire while he was at the
apartment complex. (R. 136/34). Approximately an hour later, Scott Cole called
Mr. Nelson and told him that the police wanted to talk to him about a fire. (R.
136/35).
Mr. Nelson returned to the apartment complex. (R. 136/35-36). After the
police left the Defendant returned to his apartment and asked what was going on?
(R. 136/36-37). There were two firemen still inside Defendant's apartment and
they called the police.

(R. 136/37). The police returned and questioned the

Defendant. He was belligerent with the police and they took him down to the
ground and placed handcuffs on him. (R. 136/38).
Officer Olsen from the Ogden Police Department returned to the scene and
interviewed the Defendant. (R. 136/81). Defendant told Officer Olsen that he had
left his apartment around midnight to go find some udope." (R. 136/82). Defendant
also told Officer Olsen that when he left the apartment his friend Shaun Peat was in

6

the apartment and he assumed that Mr. Peat would be there when he returned. (R.
136/83). During the interview, the Defendant said, "who's fucking dick do I have
to suck to go to prison?" He also stated that he didn't want to have to pay for rent
and food and he couldn't "sling" enough "dope" to support his habit and that he
wanted to go to jail.

(R. 136/84).

At that point Officer Olsen transported

Defendant to jail. Id.
It was later determined that the Defendant was being evicted from his
apartment. A three day notice to quit, and an unlawful detainer action had been
filed by the landlord. (R. 136/116-17).
Shaun Peat, the Defendant's friend who was allegedly inside the apartment
on the date the fire started testified at the trial that he was in Illinois from March
20, 2003 until the time of the trial. (R. 136/124).
Matthew Schwenk who is the fire marshal for the Ogden City Fire
Department investigated the fire. (R. 136/131). He determined that the fire started
inside the apartment. (R. 136/136). He also determined that the fire was started by
some papers on the floor behind the couch and it was not accidental. (R. 136/152153). This conclusion was based on the fact that he didn't find anything that could
have caused an accidental fire nor did he find the source of the original flame. (R.
136/153). Mr. Schwenk acknowledged on cross-examination that he knew where
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the fire started but he didn't know how it started and he didn't know who started it.
(R. 136/157).
Following jury deliberations, the Defendant was found guilty as charged.
(R. 136/204-05).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Defendant raises two points on appeal. First, his trial counsel was
ineffective when he failed to move the trial court for a directed verdict at the
conclusion of the State's case. Second, the trial court committed plain error when
it didn't dismiss the case due to insufficiency of the evidence.
The evidence against the Defendant was circumstantial. A fire started in his
apartment. There were no witnesses to the fire. The Defendant was seen outside
his apartment a short time before the fire started. He returned several hours after
the fire was extinguished.

When the Defendant was observed outside his

apartment the door was open. He was known to leave his apartment door open.
When the police arrived they found his door closed but unlocked.
The fire marshal who investigated the fire determined that the fire was
intentionally started but he couldn't say for sure what started the fire or who started
it. The Defendant's trial attorney failed to move the court for a directed verdict.
For these reasons, the Defendant asks this Court to find that his trial counsel was
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ineffective and that the trial court committed plain error for failing to dismiss the
case at the conclusion of the State's evidence.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF
THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1,
SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION BY HIS ATTORNEY'S FAILURE TO MOVE
THE TRIAL COURT FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the right to counsel is
the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 686, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 692 (1984). In Strickland, the Supreme Court
established a two-part test to determine whether counsel's assistance was
ineffective.

"First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was

deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel
was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693.
In making that assessment, the Court in Strickland v. Washington gave some
guidance in noting, "[t]he proper measure of attorney performance remains simply
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Id. at 688. Although the
Court in Strickland did not "exhaustively define the obligations of counsel nor
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form a checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney performance", Id. at 688, it did
mention certain minimal requirements. These duties include, "a duty of loyalty, a
duty to avoid conflicts of interest" as well as a duty "to consult with the defendant
on important decisions and to keep the defendant informed of important
developments in the course of the prosecution" Id. at 688. Additionally, the
overreaching requirement by the Supreme Court in ineffective assistance of
counsel cases is that the "performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance
was reasonable considering all the circumstances." Id. at 688.
Several other cases more specifically define when a defense counsels
performance has slipped below the threshold cited above.
In the case of Kimmelmcin v. Morrrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986) the Court was
presented with a case where defense counsel, due to a failure to conduct proper
discovery, did not timely file a motion to suppress evidence under the 4
Amendment. The Supreme Court found the attorney's performance to be deficient.
The Court stated:
Where defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim
competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the
defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is
meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict
would have been different absent the excludable evidence in order to
demonstrate actual prejudice. Kimmelmcin v. Morrrison, All U.S. 365,
375(1986).
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In making the determination that trial counsels conduct failed to
comport with constitutional requirements the Court held:
In this case, however, we deal with a total failure to conduct pretrial
discovery, and one as to which counsel offered only implausible
explanations. Counsel's performance at trial, while generally
creditable enough, suggests no better explanation for this apparent and
pervasive failure to "make reasonable investigations or to make a
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary."
[citation omitted] Under these circumstances, although the failure of
the District Court and the Court of Appeals to examine counsel's
overall performance was inadvisable, we think this omission did not
affect the soundness of the conclusion both courts reached — that
counsel's performance fell below the level of reasonable professional
assistance in the respects alleged. Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All U.S.
365,386(1986).
The Utah Appellate Courts have adopted the Strickland test and have
likewise rendered decisions in ineffective assistance of counsel cases that can
guide a determination of when a defense attorney fails in his appointed duties.
In State v. Smith, 65 P. 3d 648, 656 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) this Court reversed
a defendant's conviction under an ineffective assistance of counsel theory where
counsel "fail[ed] to move for a directed verdict after the State failed to present
evidence that Smith did not possess a valid concealed weapon permit during its
case in chief."
In the present case, defense counsel failed to move for a directed verdict
after the State rested. Assuming arguendo that defense counsel failed to make a
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motion to the trial court that the trial court would have granted, this failure, and
this failure alone would constitute ineffective assistance of counsel under the
definition of Strickland and it's Federal and State progeny. The general practice of
defense counsel in criminal trials is to move for a directed verdict or motion to
dismiss after the state has rested. This is especially true when the state has failed to
strongly establish one or more of the elements of the charge.
In State v. Smith, 65 P. 3d 648, 655 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) the Utah Court of
Appeals held, "[w]e conclude that trial counsel's failure to raise this lack of
evidence as a basis for dismissal of the charge is 'so deficient as to fall below an
objective standard of reasonableness.'" (Citations omitted) In the present case
there is simply no reason for trial counsel not to move the court for a directed
verdict when the evidence against the Defendant was entirely circumstantial. This
failure clearly fulfills the first prong of the Strickland test.
The second prong of the test is whether ''counsel's errors were so serious as
to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland,
at 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. Again, in the case of State v. Smith, 65 P.
3d 648, 655 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) this Court ruled that "[h]ad trial counsel raised
this lack of evidence, there is a reasonable probability that the trial court would
have dismissed the concealed weapon charge."
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In the case at bar, the evidence against the Defendant was circumstantial. A
fire started in his apartment. The fire marshal determined that it was an intentional
fire. There were no witnesses who saw how the fire started or who started it. The
Defendant was seen outside his apartment prior to the fire and he returned a few
hours after the fire was extinguished. When the Defendant was seen outside his
apartment the door was open. There was evidence that he regularly left his door
open (R. 136/69). When the police arrived at his apartment his door was closed,
but unlocked. (R. 136/90).
Based on the insufficient evidence, Defendant's counsel should have moved
the court to dismiss the case. Under Rule 17(p) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the trial court "may issue an order dismissing any information ... upon
the ground that the evidence is not legally sufficient to establish the offense
charged therein or any lesser included offense." Defense counsel did not raise that
possibility for the trial court to decide.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN
FAILING TO ENTER A DIRECTED VERDICT OF AQUITTAL
AT THE CLOSE OF THE PROSECUTIONS CASE FOR
REASONS THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICENT EVIDENCE
TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION.
In State v. Holgate, 10 P.3d 346, 350 (Utah 2000) the Utah Supreme Court
held "as a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on
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appeal." However, this general rule is tempered when trial counsel's performance
falls below a reasonable standard. This Court further stated "[i]t necessarily
follows that the trial court plainly errs if it submits the case to the jury and thus
fails to discharge a defendant when the insufficiency of the evidence is apparent to
the court." Id. at 351 (emphasis added).
The Defendant recognizes the difficult burden he must overcome in
challenging a trial court's failure to dismiss for lack of evidence. The court's power
"to review a jury verdict challenged on grounds of insufficient evidence is limited."
State v. Rudolph, 3 P.3d 192, 196 (2000). This Utah Supreme Court has said,
"[s]o long as there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which
findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our
inquiry stops." State v. Mead 27 P.3d 1115, 1132 (Utah 2001) (citations omitted).
Additionally, in State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) the Court stated,
u

[o]rdinarily, a reviewing court may not reassess credibility or reweigh the

evidence, but must resolve conflicts in the evidence in favor of the jury verdict."
The Utah Appellate Courts have, however, ruled that absent sufficient
evidence establishing each element of the offense charged, an Appellate Court may
overturn a conviction. In State v. Workman, infra at 985, the Utah Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's arrest of judgment from a conviction of sexual
exploitation of a minor holding: "A guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is based
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solely on inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative possibilities of
guilt." In that case, the prosecution presented no evidence, expert or otherwise, that
the photograph in question could have been taken for purposes of sexual arousal.
Given that lack of evidence the Court vacated the defendant's guilty verdict.
Similarly, in the case of State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983) the Court
reversed the conviction of a defendant in a second degree murder case where the
evidence as to intent was deficient. In that case there was undisputed evidence that
the victim had been murdered. The sole evidence against the defendant consisted
of the fact that the defendant was the last person seen with the victim, and the fact
that he had related a dream to three individuals in which he recalled slapping the
girl and that he ''thought he hurt her. He thought he might have killed her." Id. at
446. In that case, the Court also stated:
The fabric of evidence against the defendant must cover the gap
between the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt. In
fulfillment of its duty to review the evidence and all inferences which
may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the
verdict, the reviewing court will stretch the evidentiary fabric as far as
it will go. But this does not mean that the court can take a speculative
leap across a remaining gap in order to sustain a verdict. The
evidence, stretched to its utmost limits, must be sufficient to prove the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 444-445.
Furthermore, in the recent case of State v. Shumway, 63 P.3d 94 (Utah 2002)
the Utah Supreme Court, reversed the trial court's conviction of evidence
tampering. In that case, there was some expert testimony that opined that a second,
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smaller knife had also been used in a murder of an individual. No other evidence as
to a second weapon (the first weapon was recovered) was found, but rather, the
prosecution relied on an inference that the defendant had the motive and
opportunity to dispose of a second weapon. In reversing that conviction, the Court
held:
After giving full weight to all of the evidence supporting [the
defendants] conviction of evidence tampering, we conclude that the
evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. At most, the
evidence supports only the proposition that [the defendant] had the
opportunity to destroy or conceal the second implement, if indeed it
ever existed. Id. at 100.
While the Defendant is cognizant of the requirement to marshal evidence in
support of the jury's verdict, the Defendant submits that even with an extensive
marshaling of evidence the jury's verdict cannot be supported. It is undisputed that
there were no witnesses who could identify Defendant as the person who started
the fire. The State failed to prove how the fire was started or who was responsible
for starting it. The evidence was only speculative that it was the Defendant who
started the fire.

CONCLUSION
Although the fire started in Defendant's apartment, the State failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant started it and that he had the intent to
commit an aggravated arson. Based on the lack of evidence, reasonable minds
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should have entertained a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed the crime
he was convicted of. For these reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests this
Court to reverse his conviction.
DATED this 22nd day of March, 2004,
-^

^/^
DEE W. SMITH
/ /
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Mark
Shurtleff, Attorney General, Attorney for the Plaintiff, 160 East 300 South, 6th
Floor PO Box 140854 SLC, Utah 84114-0180, postage prepaid t h i s ^ d a y of
March, 2004.
'"V
t)EEW. SMITH
Attorney at Law

17

••:

ADDENDUM

18

ADDENDUM A

SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 031902190 FS

LEWIS RICKY DURAN,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

W. BRENT WEST
October 8, 2003

PRESENT
Clerk:
pama
Reporter: COVINGTON, TRACY
Prosecutor: SANDRA L. CORP
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): PDA, GARY BARR
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: February 10, 1966
Video
Tape Number:
W10-8-03
Tape Count: 11:21
CHARGES
1. AGGRAVATED ARSON - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 09/05/2003 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ARSON a 1st
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State
Prison.
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.

090
Page 1

Case No: 031902190
Date:
Oct 08, 2003

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
The defendant is granted credit for the time he has served on this
case.
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
The Court recommends to the Board of Pardons that the defendant be
responsible for restitution in the amount of $14,837.83 and that he
be involved in drug treatment.

Dated this

3 ^ day of

OWO**-

, 20 C&

W. BRENT WEST
District Court Judge
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